CVE-2026-18414
CVE-2026-18414 is a high-severity vulnerability in Zephyrproject Zephyr with a CVSS 3.x base score of 7.8. It is not currently listed as actively exploited by CISA, and its EPSS exploit-prediction score is low. The underlying weakness is classified as CWE-787.
Key facts
- Severity: High (CVSS 3.x base score 7.8)
- EPSS exploit prediction: 0% (2nd percentile)
- Actively exploited: Not listed in CISA KEV
- Weakness: CWE-787
- Affected product: Zephyrproject Zephyr
- Published:
- Last modified:
Description
The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence. The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer. The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started.
Frequently asked questions
- What is CVE-2026-18414?
- The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence. The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer. The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started.
- How severe is CVE-2026-18414?
- CVE-2026-18414 has a CVSS 3.x base score of 7.8, rated high severity. It is exploitable over local access with low attack complexity, requires low privileges and no user interaction. Impact on confidentiality is high, integrity high, and availability high.
- Is CVE-2026-18414 being actively exploited?
- It is not currently listed in CISA's KEV catalog. Its EPSS exploit-prediction score is 0% (2nd percentile), an estimate of the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.
- What products are affected by CVE-2026-18414?
- CVE-2026-18414 affects Zephyrproject Zephyr. See the affected-products list for the exact vulnerable versions.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-18414?
- Review the linked vendor and NVD advisories for patched versions and mitigations, then upgrade or apply the recommended workaround. Given its high severity, prioritise patching exposed systems.
- When was CVE-2026-18414 published?
- CVE-2026-18414 was published on 2026-09-28 and last updated on 2026-11-04.
References
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3bda971a52ddbbec28f6fcfe3b006d34e8b9e5a9
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/9338c518bf2b6a396f166d4dbe9985ce7e44379c
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm4-78mm-8v2c
Affected products (1)
- cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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